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COLONIAL INTENTIONS AND CURRENT
REALITIES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT*
THOMAS I. EMERSONt
I. THE ORIGINAL INTENTION
History is seldom simple or forthright. This is surely true of
the concept of freedom of expression as expounded in the Dec-
laration of Independence and the Constitution. It is by no means
clear exactly what the colonists had in mind, or just what they
expected from the guarantee of freedom of speech, press, as-
sembly, and petition.
Some starting points are relatively certain. The framers of
the Declaration of Independence and, perhaps less intensely, the
drafters of the Constitution, began with John Locke's social
compact theories.' And, as a corollary, they viewed certain rights
of the individuals who entered into the compact as natural and
"unalienable" rights, inherent in the individual and not depen-
dent upon the largess of the state. Some, but apparently not all,
of these rights were embodied in an actual compact, the Con-
stitution. The guarantee of the first amendment was clearly in-
tended to reach the extent described by Blackstone, 2 namely as a
prohibition of any system of control over the process of printing,
any advance censorship of publication, and the like.
Many issues were not fully resolved. It was not clear whether
all groups were to be included within the protection of the
guarantee to freedom of expression. Slaves were obviously ex-
cluded, and women did not seem to matter. John Milton, a lead-
ing English exponent of freedom of expression who was well
known to the colonists, would not have extended freedom of
* This Article was presented as a paper at the Bicentennial Program of the Judicial
Conference of the Third Circuit in Philadelphia, September 1976.
t Lines Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale University.
I See J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 164-79 (Everyman's Library
ed. 1924).
'See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151. Blackstone construed liberty of the
press as consisting of "no previous restraints upon publications and not in freedom
from censure for criminal matter when published." Presumably, government suppres-
sion could legitimately begin at the time of publication.
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speech to Catholics, atheists, Turks, or other non-Christians.3
Locke would apparently have denied political liberties to
Catholics and would have punished those who "will not own and
teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere re-
ligion."4 Moreover, the impact of the first amendment upon the
law of seditious libel, which punished any militant attack upon
the government or its officials, was not explained. Nor was there
any effort to reconcile the first amendment with the law of pri-
vate libel, the offense of blasphemy, or the emerging law of
obscenity. Professor Zechariah Chafee, Dean Leonard W. Levy,
and others have differed sharply concerning the intentions of
the founding fathers with respect to these and other matters.
5
The era in which the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution were framed was actually a period of transition.
Milton's and Locke's views concerning the exclusion of distaste-
ful groups were being challenged. The colonial courts were still
enforcing the law of seditious libel, but political theorists were
moving toward ideas of absolute protection for political ex-
pression. Different individuals, holding different philosophies,
placed different interpretations upon the broad concept of free-
dom of speech, press, assembly, and petition. Moreover, not only
was there no real concensus on these issues, but there was no
extensive discussion of detailed constitutional application.
The Alien and Sedition Acts, enacted in 1798, did serve to
focus attention upon some major problems and did generate
some elaboration of the theory underlying the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression.6 But there was no Supreme
3 J. MILTON, AREOPAGITICA 38 (Everyman's Library ed. 1927) [hereinafter cited as
AREOPAGITICA]; J. MILTON, A Treatise of Civil Power in Ecclesiastical Causes, in 6 THE
WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 13-14 (F. Patterson ed. 1932); J. MILTON, Of True Religion,
Heresie, Schism, and Toleration, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN MILTON 172-73 (F. Patterson
ed. 1932).
4
J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE 46 (Lon-
don 1823).
5
See Z. CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 3-35 (1941); L. LEVY,
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY
(1960). Professor Chafee argues that the framers of the first amendment intended to
eliminate the common law crime of sedition and to prevent prosecutions for criticism of
the government. Dean Levy, however, claims that "libertarian theory from the time of
Milton to the ratification of the First Amendment substantially accepted the right of the
state to suppress seditious libel." L. LEVY, supra at vi. He believes that it is impossible to
ascertain the actual intentions of the framers.
6 The Alien Act allowed the President to compel the departure of aliens whom he
judged dangerous to public safety or who were suspected of plotting against the gov-
ernment; the Sedition Act punished false, scandalous, and malicious writings against the
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Court decision on the matter. And subsequently no other federal
legislation raised first amendment questions for well over a cen-
tury. In addition, the first amendment was not applicable to the
states.7 Civil liberties conflicts were usually fought out in nonju-
dicial arenas or solved by escape to the frontiers. Consequently,
in the immediate post-Constitution era, the views of the framers
were never fully explicated in either legislative chambers, court
opinions, or legal treatises.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not consider any major
first amendment question until 1919, when issues arising under
World War I legislation were presented." It was not until 1925
that the first amendment was held applicable to the States, pre-
cipitating extensive judicial examination of state restrictions.9 By
that time the historical events surrounding the adoption of the
Constitution had long receded. Moreover, greatly changed con-
ditions faced the courts.
As a result the Supreme Court, in interpreting the first
amendment, has not seemed particularly concerned with the
specifics of the original intention, and has not addressed itself in
depth to these issues. In New York Times v. Sullivan,"' it did pick
up the threads of history enough to declare the Sedition Act of
1798 a violation of the first amendment; but the Court was per-
functory in its examination of the intentions of the drafters of
the Constitution. Here, as in interpreting the equal protection
clause and most other provisions of the Constitution, the Court
has instead looked to the underlying principles sought to be
achieved by the Constitution, in terms of their current applicabil-
ity. It has, in short, adopted the theory of a living constitution,
rather than one fixed in time as specifically visualized by the
founders. In my judgment, this approach is entirely correct.
government if published with the intent to defame or to stir up sedition or resistance to
the law.
'E.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1921); Patterson v. Col-
orado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1906); cf. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 92 (1908)
(first 10 amendments inapplicable to the states).
' See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). In Schenck, the Court adopted
the "clear and present danger" test to affirm the conviction of defendants who had
printed and circulated a document opposing the military draft. See generally Strong, Fifty
Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond, 1969 Sup.
CT. REv. 41.
9 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (dicta). See also Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927); Whitney v. Califor-
nia, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
10 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
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When turning back to history, therefore, it is more profit-
able to explore the minds of the framers in the very broadest
terms in order to try to ascertain the fundamental principles that
they sought to establish. What, then, were the basic functions of
a system of freedom of expression that the founders hoped to
realize in guaranteeing the specific manifestations which were at
that time important to them-freedom of speech, press, assem-
bly, and petition? And to what extent have these functions been
secured in the present system?
The historical evidence reveals that the colonists viewed the
essential functions of a system of freedom of expression much as
we do today. First, the colonists conceived of the right to free-
dom of speech, press, assembly, and petition as vital to the pro-
cess of discovering truth, through exposure to all the facts, open
discussion, and testing of opinions. In a famous passage Milton
thus declared:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose
to play upon the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do
injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt
her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever
knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open en-
counter?"
The preamble to the Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom
of 1785, written by Thomas Jefferson, reiterated Milton's view,
that truth is great and will prevail if left to herself; that
she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and
has nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human
interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free ar-
gument and debate; errors ceasing to be dangerous
when it is permitted freely to contradict them. 2
The most famous restatement of the proposition in modern
times is that of Mr. Justice Holmes:
But when men have realized that time has upset
many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even
more than they believe the very foundations of their
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
lAROPAGITICA, supra note 3, at 36.
12 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 546 (J. Boyd et al. eds. 1950-1974).
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truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be car-
ried out.
13
Today we are not inclined to speak of the process as one of
discovering "the truth." We are more likely to talk in terms of
"advancing knowledge" or "reaching the better decision." But
the underlying function is basically the same. The essential point
is that the process is necessary for reaching the best social deci-
sion, regardless of whether ultimate values are conceived in abso-
lute or relative terms. The theory is invalid only on the untena-
ble premise that society already possesses all truth or on the
authoritarian premise that only a single individual or small
group can know and proclaim the truth.
The process is essentially the method of science. The theory
of freedom of expression, indeed, developed in conjunction
with, and as an integral part of, the growth of the scientific
method. Locke, following Hobbes, based his philosophical and
political theories on the premises of science. And the proponents
of free expression were all men who, in the broad sense at least,
put their faith in progress through free and rational inquiry.
Hence the process they envisaged operates upon the same prin-
ciples as those that guided the men of science: the refusal to
accept existing authority; the constant search for new knowl-
edge; the insistence upon exposing their facts and opinions to
opposition and criticism; the belief that rational discussion pro-
duces the better, though not necessarily the final, judgment.
This process did not ignore prior knowledge or opinion, but it
did insist upon the responsibility of the individual to challenge
such opinion and upon the obligation of all to make reasoned
conclusions based upon the evidence.
A second major function of the system of free expression
was also clearly intended by the colonists who proclaimed the
Declaration of Independence and adopted the Constitution.
Freedom of expression is necessary to a democratic political pro-
cess. The Declaration of Independence rests on the proposition,
straight from John Locke, that governments derive "their just
powers from the consent of the governed." From this premise it
follows that the citizens, the ultimate holders of sovereign power,
13 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
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must have full freedom of expression in order to reach their
individual judgments, in order to arrive at a common decision,
and in order to instruct their servant, the government. The pro-
tection extended by the Constitution to freedom of speech,
press, assembly, and petition was obviously designed to imple-
ment this underlying political structure.
The most persuasive contemporary exponent of this func-
tion of freedom of expression is Dr. Alexander Meiklejohn.
Pointing out that the function of the first amendment "lies deep
in the very foundations of the self-governing process," he pro-
ceeded to say:
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one
else-who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and un-
fairness and danger. And that means that unwise ideas
must have a hearing as well as wise ones, unfair as well
as fair, dangerous as well as safe, un-American as well
as American. Just so far as, at any point, the citizens
who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with
information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism
which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must
be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general
good. It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the com-
munity against which the First Amendment to the Constitution
is directed. The principle of the freedom of speech
springs from the necessities of the program of self-
government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in
the abstract. It is a deduction from the basic American
agreement that public issues shall be decided by univer-
sal suffrage.
1 4
I believe that history confirms Dr. Meiklejohn but goes
beyond his position. The basic right to freedom of expression
was not meant to be confined to the political realm. As the
guarantee of freedom of conscience, also incorporated in the
first amendment, reveals, the scope of the constitutional protec-
tion was intended to extend to religion, art, science, and all areas
of human learning and knowledge.
A third function of the system of freedom of expression,
though not as clearly articulated by the colonists, was implied in
the social compact theories of John Locke. The system is a form
14 A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960) (emphasis in original).
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of social control that strikes a balance in society between stability
and movement, thereby allowing for necessary change without
resort to violence. It shields the community from sterility and
stultification, allows society to test proposed new measures in the
realm of ideas and discussion before committing itself to actual
trial and error, and provides a legitimizing process for reaching
hard, and to some participants objectionable, decisions. This way
of life-this sense of vital, rational, and peaceful progress-was
expressed most eloquently by Milton:
Behold now this vast City: a city of refuge, the
mansion house of liberty, encompassed and surrounded
with His protection; the shop of war hath not there
more anvils and hammers waking, to fashion out the
plates and instruments of armed Justice in defence of
beleaguered Truth, than there be pens and heads there,
sitting by their studious lamps, musing, searching, re-
volving new notions and ideas wherewith to present, as
with their homage and their fealty, the approaching
Reformation: others as fast reading, trying all things,
assenting to the force of reason and convincement.
What could a man require more from a Nation so pliant
and so prone to seek after knowledge? What wants
there to such a towardly and pregnant soil, but wise and
faithful labourers, to make a knowing people, a Nation
of Prophets, of Sages, and of Worthies? We reckon
more than five months yet to harvest; there need not be
five weeks; had we but eyes to lift up, the fields are
white already.
15
In a remarkable letter to the inhabitants of the Province of
Quebec, the Continental Congress neatly capsuled the expecta-
tions of the colonists with respect to all three functions of a
system of freedom of expression that I have just summarized:
The last right we shall mention regards the free-
dom of the press. The importance of this consists, be-
sides the advancement of truth, science, morality and
arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments
on the administration of government, its ready com-
munication of thoughts between subjects, and its conse-
quential promotion of union among them, whereby op-
15
AREOPAGITICA, supra note 3, at 32.
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pressive officers are shamed or intimidated into more
honorable and just modes of conducting affairs.'
6
A fourth function of the constitutional guarantee of free-
dom of expression remains. Not only was freedom of speech,
press, assembly, and petition considered as a social good, essen-
tial for the progress of society, but it was also viewed as an
important means for personal fulfillment. Again, this function
was not as fully articulated in colonial times as it is today. The
colonists were not thinking as intently as we do now in terms of
protecting the individual against the manifold pressures of the
collective. In the new country with its endless frontiers the collec-
tive was not that powerful or pervasive or confining. Neverthe-
less, basic notions of Western individualism were inherent in the
social compact theories embraced by the colonists. These notions
were given express recognition by Milton when he declared, in
opposing licensing of the press, that such restraint over expres-
sion is "the greatest displeasure and indignity to a free and
knowing spirit that can be put upon him."'"
The goal of the first amendment to allow the realization of
full individual potential has changed. As we have grown into a
highly technical, heavily populated, more collective world, it has
evolved in importance. But the core of the concept was certainly
present in the colonial mind, awaiting fuller development in our
time.
The ideas and attitudes of the colonists toward the "unalien-
able" right to freedom of expression were based upon political,
economic, and psychological premises that differ in some impor-
tant respects from those held today. But the basic meaning of
the first amendment for present society remains essentially the
same. That meaning was best summarized by Mr. Justice Bran-
deis concurring in Whitney v. California:"8
Those who won our independence believed that
the final end of the State was to make men free to
develop their faculties; and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
16 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 108 (W. Ford et al.
eds. 1904-1937), quoted in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717 (1931) (Chief Justice
Hughes).
1
7 
AREOPAGITICA, supra note 3, at 21.
18 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and
courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly
discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion
affords ordinarily adequate protection against the
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public dis-
cussion is a political duty; and that this should be a
fundamental principle of the A~nerican government.
They recognized the risks to which all human institu-
tions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be
secured merely through fear of punishment for its in-
fraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought,
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable gov-
ernment; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity
to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed
remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil coun-
sels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed si-
lence coerced by law-the argument of force in its worst
form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of govern-
ing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that
free speech and assembly should be guaranteed. 19
Our remaining task is to examine briefly the extent to which
these objectives of the first amendment have been actually
realized in our nation today.
II. THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH
On the whole, the function of the first amendment in pro-
moting the search for truth, or in advancing knowledge, has in
my judgment been substantially realized in the United States.
In our constitutional theory the right to freedom of expression
now extends to all groups in our society. Even antidemocratic
groups-those that would destroy freedom of expression if they
achieved political power-are entitled to the protection of the
first amendment. Although this proposition has never been the
1 91 Id. at 375-76 (concurring opinion) (footnote omitted).
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express subject of a full opinion by the Supreme Court, it was
stated very early in the development of first amendment doc-
trine by Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Gitlow v. New York:" ° "If
in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship
are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the com-
munity, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be
given their chance and have their way."12 1 Some individuals have
argued to the contrary, but I think it fair to say that the views of
Mr. Justice Holmes stand today as the accepted law of the land.
Similarly, in our constitutional theory the guarantees of the
first amendment encompass the right to express all ideas, opin-
ions, and judgments, regardless of how objectionable they may
be to others. A partial qualification nevertheless remains for
obscenity, which in its "hard core" manifestations may be
suppressed.2 2 Also, the 1952 decision of the Supreme Court in
Beauharnais v. Illinois,23 in upholding a group libel statute, sug-
gested that racist opinions may be restricted; but I do not believe
the Court would reach the same conclusion today. As a general
proposition, prevailing first amendment doctrine extends pro-
tection to all kinds of expression, no matter how "fraught with
death."
Indeed, the Supreme Court has gone somewhat further. On
a number of occasions the Court has recognized a constitutional
foundation for the principles of academic freedom. 24 Although
this area of constitutional theory has been slow to develop, it
does give promise that the principles and practices that enable
institutions of learning and research to function as social critics
and innovators may be entitled to a special place under the pro-
tective umbrella afforded by the first amendment. It should be
noted, however, that hard problems are now looming on the
horizon. Courts must soon decide, for example, whether certain
kinds of genetic research may be prohibited or regulated.2 5 It is
20 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
2 11d. at 673.
22 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 54 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973).
23 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
24 See, e.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). See also T. EMERSON, THE
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 613-14 (1970).
25 For example, the Cambridge, Massachusetts City Council recently took steps to
curb recombinant DNA research at Harvard University and at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology, declaring a three-month "good faith" moratorium on the work.
Whether local involvement in decisions concerning biological research is permissible
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hard to predict where these issues will lead.
I have thus far dealt with constitutional theory. Practice,
however, has not always conformed to theory. Our society places
real obstacles upon the search for truth and the advancement of
knowledge, sometimes through government regulation. On the
whole, these restrictions have been indirect, rather than direct,
sanctions upon expression. They have involved such controls as
loyalty programs, other impositions of political qualifications for
holding positions of power or obtaining benefits, inquisitions by
legislative committees, surveillance, harassment, and the like.
26 I
think it fair to say, however, that the effect of these restrictions
has been more to limit political participation in the democratic
process than to inhibit the exposition of abstract ideas. They will
therefore be considered in connection with the second function
of a system of freedom of expression, the preservation of a dem-
ocratic political process.
Nor can it be said that our system affords equality in the
ability to communicate different points of view or to pursue
different goals of inquiry. As we shall see, neither equal access to
the mass media nor equal right to the support of public funds
presently exists. What we have secured in this area is rather the
right of the individual to follow the truth wherever it may lead,
though the road is often a lonely one.
This is a real accomplishment. It should not be casually writ-
ten off or slowly whittled away through the failure to acknowl-
edge its significance.
III. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
The function of the first amendment in affording citizens
the opportunity to exercise their prerogative as wielders of ulti-
mate power has, in my judgment, been less fully achieved. There
are important positive features in the system as it operates today.
It has already been noted that, in general, expression of unor-
thodox or radical political ideas, as such, is protected. The right
of association, in general, is also recognized. 7 Moreover, the
system has in practice achieved important successes. Spectacular
may face judicial determination in the future. See Culliton, Recombinant DNA: Cambridge
City Council Votes Moratorium, 193 SCIENCE 300 (1976).
26 For a discussion of the pervasiveness of loyalty programs during the 1950's, see
generally R. S. BROWN, JR., LOYALTY AND SECURITY (1958); W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS (1956).
27 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
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examples of such successes include the operation of the system
in supporting the civil rights movement, in legitimizing opposi-
tion to the Viet Nam war, and in exposing the abuses of Water-
gate.
Nevertheless, the full potential of the first amendment has
certainly not been realized. Most of the problems arise out of
changes that have occurred since the colonists framed the first
amendment. These developments include our growing indus-
trialization, technology, bureaucratization, and other features of
our post-industrial society. They are, in short, the product of
mass democracy, a situation with which the colonists did not
have to deal. They must be dealt with, however, if the first
amendment is to function properly under modern conditions.
A. Legal Doctrines
The first problem concerns legal doctrines developed by the
Supreme Court in a number of critical first amendment areas,
primarily pertaining to radical speech and radical political as-
sociations. One important aspect involves the dividing line be-
tween militant expression and illegal action. The problem is cru-
cial. Most radical political movements contain the seeds of, and
may be accompanied by, violent or other illegal action. Sub-
merged groups or groups with grievances face a full panoply of
laws, institutions, and practices, designed mainly to preserve the
status quo. Leaders, and often rank and file, trying to break
through the encrusted establishment become frustrated and
angry. The rhetoric becomes militant. Some converts to the
cause may break over the traces and seek a solution by "direct
action." In this they may be helped along by police provocation
or by agents provocateurs. Many social movements in the United
States that have achieved valuable social gains have had such a
history; one finds the same pattern in efforts for increasing po-
litical power initiated by labor, by racial minorities, and by
feminists. The various facets of the problem are not easy for
society to sort out. Society must defend law and order without
suppressing expression; achieve necessary social change rather
than ignore valid grievances; and punish excesses without de-
stroying a whole movement plus many others on the periphery
of the movement.
Present legal doctrines for attaining these goals seem inade-
quate. Originally the Supreme Court applied, very erratically,
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the clear and present danger test.28 Later it flirted with balanc-
ing theories, and still does. The current prevailing doctrine
seems to be the Brandenburg v. Ohio29 rule: speech may be pun-
ished when it "is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."0
None of these doctrines seem to me to be either sound in theory
or workable in practice. The purpose of the first amendment is
to give special protection to expression, as distinct from other
conduct. The fact that speech is inciting (as is a great deal of
speech) or that it may result in illegal action (as effective speech
may be likely to do) is not a sufficient ground for suppression.
Society has other ways to control action without controlling
speech. Moreover, the formulations are so vague and undefined
that, while purporting to apply them, the courts, prosecutors,
police, and other officials can reach almost any result. Only a
serious effort to separate expression from action and to give
expression full protection will provide a satisfactory answer.
Other legal doctrines have been applied to the problem of
symbolic speech. This form of expression was elaborated and
refined during the 1960's. Its development was a response in
part to the difficulty of reaching an audience, and in part to the
growing impact of television. Whatever the reasons for its ad-
vent, the use of symbolic expression constituted an important
innovation in the system. It also presented the difficulty of
separating expression from action. The Supreme Court's solu-
tion in United States v. O'Brien3' was, in my judgment, a disaster.
The formula employed by the Court did not even reach the level
of a balancing test. In essence the Court adopted a test of mere
reasonableness: if the government's regulation has some valid
28 The phrase "clear and present danger" originated in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v.
United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919). Under the test, speech may not be curtailed until
there is an immediate risk of danger; the proximity and degree of danger are the
crucial factors to be assessed. See Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., and the Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J.
AM. HIST. 24 (1971).
29 395 U.S. 444 (1969). For a more recent invocation of the Brandenburg incitement
standard, see Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (using Brandenburg as the primary
ground for reversal of a disorderly conduct conviction).
30 395 U.S. at 447.
31 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien seemed to subordinate the elements of speech and
expression in symbolic draft-card burning and has received critical attention. See, e.g.,
Alfange, Jr., Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case, 1968 Sup. CT.
REV. 1.
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purpose, its effect upon expression will be ignored. More true to
the function of the first amendment would be a test that first
attempts to determine whether expression or action was the do-
minant element in the conduct and then, if expression were
found to predominate, gives that expression full protection.
Another set of legal doctrines relates to the problem, al-
ready mentioned, of indirect sanctions imposed upon political
expression. The issues here are crucial. Protection against direct
sanctions does not mean much in terms of political participation,
if indirect restraints may be imposed. Citizens may have full
freedom to exchange ideas, but if benefits may be cut off, liveli-
hoods obstructed, or careers destroyed as soon as citizens at-
tempt to implement ideas through political association, the sys-
tem cannot be said to function as the framers had in mind. The
Supreme Court's original reaction to this problem, in American
Communications Association v. Douds32 in 1950, was to apply the
balancing test. This test afforded little protection and can hardly
be expected to furnish more. Later Supreme Court decisions
have imposed somewhat stricter requirements, approaching
standards used in direct sanction cases.3 3 But the Court has
never fully clarified the issues. We are now in a less repressive
period, but the problem still exists and could become acute again
at any time.
One further doctrinal area requires serious attention. This
involves the attitude and approach of the courts to various prac-
tices of the police and intelligence agencies. Again the issues are
critical. The impact upon freedom of expression of political sur-
veillance, political harassment, and similar police conduct cannot
realistically be doubted. Yet the courts, led by the Supreme
Court, have refused to curtail the activities of the intelligence
services in surveillance cases. 34 It is hard to believe that the
32 339 U.S. 382 (1950). The "balancing" approach, as opposed to the "absolutist"
position, was a classic area of confrontation between Mr. Justices Harlan and Black.
Compare their views for the majority and in dissent, respectively, in Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). See also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH (1962); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L. J.
877 (1963).3 3E.g., Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589 (1967).
3 4 See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); cf. California Bankers Ass'n v.
Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (upholding extensive data collection). But see United States v.
United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (rejecting claims of inherent power in
President to use wiretapping when required by "national security"); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (establishing con-
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courts will not find first amendment violations in the harassment
cases now pending; but Rizzo v. Goode35 indicates that they are
ready to place major obstacles in the way of proof and to afford
inadequate remedies. The reluctance of the courts to place effec-
tive controls over the intelligence agencies is a troublesome sign
of weakness in our system of freedom of expression.
B. Monopoly and Distortion
Perhaps the major discrepancy between the system of free-
dom of expression visualized by the colonists and the system as it
exists today is the nature of the marketplace in which political
expression takes place. That marketplace is dominated by the
mass media, and the communications flowing into the market
largely reflect a single political, economic, and social point of
view. Many would-be speakers do not have access to the market,
and there is a serious lack of diversity. The marketplace today, in
short, is hardly a pure Adam Smith type of market, as the col-
onists undoubtedly expected it would be.
The solution is clearly not government regulation of the
mass communications industry in the same way the government
attempts to regulate the nuclear power industry or other busi-
ness enterprises. Such regulation has been suggested or hinted at
by former Vice President Agnew and other critics. The system of
freedom of expression, however, must remain essentially laissez
faire. It may be the last vestige of laissezfaire, but the one thing it
cannot be, and still remain a free system, is government con-
trolled.
This brings us to a basic question to which we have not given
much attention. How much equality of access to the marketplace
should there be, or need there be, in a functioning system of
free expression? Plainly we cannot have exact equality, by what-
ever standard equality may be measured. That kind of system
could be instituted only by means of complete government con-
trol, a contradiction in terms. Majority views will always com-
mand the greater prominence. All that can be expected is that
dissenting or unorthodox views have a substantial opportunity to
be heard; it is not essential that they be as loud or as pervasive as
stitutional standards for permissible wiretapping and electronic surveillance by govern-
ment authorities).
35 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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the majority views. It is not easy to say, however, where or how
the balance should be struck.
One solution, vigorously urged by Professor Jerome Barron
and others, is that the government should make broad provision,
by constitutional interpretation or by legislation, for a compul-
sory right of access to the mass media.3 6 As far as the printed
press is concerned, it is hard to see how this could be accom-
plished, except perhaps for a limited right of reply in libel cases,
without creating an intolerable amount of government control.
The Supreme Court has apparently reached this conclusion, and
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo37 seems to preclude such
action. Access to radio and television, however, is a different
problem. At this point it need only be noted that different
treatment between the print and the electronic media is justified,
but only by reason of a scarcity of facilities in the latter area. As
long as the channels available for broadcasting are limited (a fact
now being disputed), the government must make some determi-
nation as to when and under what circumstances those desiring
to speak may have the opportunity to do so. If a licensee is
awarded the exclusive right to operate the facility, he can and
should be required to give access to other speakers. If and when
the scarcity is eliminated, however, the constitutional right to use
the electronic medium would be the same as that to use the print
medium. Economic disparities between those seeking to use the
media would not constitute valid grounds for government inter-
position.
Within this legal context, then, what solutions are available?
Those that have offered the most promise include the following:
(1) Use of the antitrust laws to break up media monopolies and use
of FCC regulations to achieve a wider diversity in the ownership of
broadcasting stations. No serious question of constitutional power
is involved here. But the practical results so far have been mi-
nute, and there is not much hope of improvement. The amount
of capital needed to operate a newspaper or run a broadcasting
station is sufficiently high to preclude most individuals or groups
seeking to present an alternative to the conventional viewpoint.
(2) The fairness doctrine. The fairness doctrine requires
broadcasting stations to present programs on important con-
"
6
See J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973); Barron, Access to the
Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
37 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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troversial issues and to provide for the representation of various
viewpoints with respect to such issues. FCC regulations embody-
ing the doctrine were upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC.3 8 The doctrine has always been vigorously attacked by the
broadcasting industry, and recently, forceful opposition has
spread to other quarters. Moreover, serious administrative dif-
ficulties have been encountered. Few find the fairness doctrine
to be very effective. On the other hand, it is preferable to noth-
ing and in my judgment should be continued.
(3) Right of access to the electronic media. Provision for access to
radio and television can take several forms. The most promising
is a requirement of free time for political candidates. Another
method is to compel broadcasting stations to accept paid political
advertisements on the same general basis as commercial adver-
tisements. Beyond this point the methods for providing access
cannot be formulated in such objective terms, and they become
more complex in administration. Nevertheless, if the will to go
forward is present, there is no reason why greater diversity on
the air could not be achieved. Although the Supreme Court held
in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee3 9
that neither the first amendment nor the existing Federal Com-
munications Act 4" required broadcasting stations to accept politi-
cal advertisements, it did not hold that legislation to provide that
or other forms of access would violate the constitutional rights of
the broadcasters. On the contrary, the Red Lion decision, declar-
ing that the broadcasting licensee is in effect a trustee or public
agent, would seem to make clear that the constitutional path is
open.
(4) Cable television. By far the most promising line of attack
upon the monopoly problem in the electronic media lies in the
development of cable television. By making available an almost
unlimited number of channels to every household reached by
telephone lines, cable television has the potential of eliminating
most or all of the scarcity factor from this form of communica-
tion. The result could be a major breakthrough in the expansion
of access to the electronic media. Whether cable television will
actually open up the electronic media, or merely reinforce the
present monopoly, depends upon the way its development is
38 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
39 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
40 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970).
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regulated. At the present time the issue remains unresolved.
(5) Expansion of the poor person's media. The right of assembly
and petition was an important feature of the system of freedom
of expression in colonial times. Meetings, marches, and dem-
onstrations were a major method of protest in the eighteenth
century. Sometimes these assemblies were violent, as was the
Boston Tea Party. Similarly, political pamphleteering played a
prominent role. All of these methods, together with additions
and refinements, remain available today for those who do not
have the financial resources to reach an audience through the
mass media. They were crucial to the civil rights movement, to
the Viet Nam war opposition, and to similar political efforts of
recent years. And they are likely to continue to be crucial in the
coming decades. The legal support for these alternative modes
of communication ought to be clarified and strengthened. Un-
fortunately, this has not been the direction of court decisions.
The law of symbolic speech, the cases attempting to separate
speech from action where assemblies have become unruly, and
the rules pertaining to licensing and injunctions, all impose qual-
ifications upon freedom of expression in this area. Recently the
Supreme Court began to set serious limitations upon the place
where first amendment rights may be exercised, as it did in the
shopping center cases.41 Thus, at the very time when use of the
poor person's media is becoming even more critical to the effec-
tive functioning of the system, the courts are tending to cir-
cumscribe rather than expand rights to expression in that area.
(6) Public subsidies. Public subsidies provide a direct, affirma-
tive way to diminish the monopoly of the mass media and in-
crease diversity. They entail obvious problems, some of which
will be mentioned at a later point.
C. The Right To Know
The colonists were fully aware of the importance in a demo-
cratic society of the right to know. A statement of James Madison
is still one of the most relevant: "A popular Government, with-
out popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge
will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be
41 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972).
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their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives."
'42
Modern conditions have accentuated rather than diminished
the significance of the right to know. Development of constitu-
tional and legislative support for this basic right has become one
of the most urgent tasks of our generation.
The Supreme Court has recognized in a number of cases
that the first amendment embodies a constitutional guarantee of
the right to know. 43 Yet it has never clarified the right or pressed
it toward its logical borders. On the contrary, in some cases it has
ignored the right to know or severely limited its application.44
In a number of areas the development of a constitutional
right to know would play a significant role in the system of
freedom of expression. In some situations the government at-
tempts to interfere directly with the right to know, as when it
imposes sanctions on reading or receiving certain materials.
Here the right to know should be afforded full protection. In
other situations the speaker, who is normally the party most
likely to seek vindication of the right to free expression, may not
be in a position to assert that right, and the listener or reader
may find it necessary to defend the right of expression by invok-
ing the constitutional right to know. From a procedural point of
view the right to know may give standing to the recipients or
potential recipients of the communication. The principles of the
right to know may be applicable when the government exercises
a monopoly or near monopoly over an area of expression, as in
the field of elementary education, or attempts to allocate scarce
facilities, as in the case of radio and television licensing. The
most significant application of the right to know, however, lies in
its potential role in increasing the amount of information avail-
able to the citizenry from the government. In my judgment
nothing would advance the cause of democracy more than for
the courts to establish the basic doctrine that government infor-
mation is public information and that, aside from a few very
precise and narrow exceptions, every citizen has a constitutional
right to obtain all such information. Government secrecy is'es-
42 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 WRITINGS
OFJAME.S MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
4' Such a right was implied, though not elucidated, in New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), the so-called Pentagon Papers case. See generally H.
CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953); R. LISTON, THE RIGHT TO KNOW (1973).
" See Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
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sentially in conflict with the underlying premises of the first
amendment.
Apart from constitutional interpretation, the right to know
may be implemented by legislation or by executive practice. Fed-
eral and state freedom of information laws and sunshine laws
have already opened up much government information that was
formerly withheld from the public.45 Indeed, the enactment of
these laws constitutes one of the most significant advances in the
system of freedom of expression in the last decade. Although
there is still much progress to be made, I believe we should
consider this development as a major accomplishment.
D. Affirmative Government Action
Like other institutions in our society, the system of freedom
of expression does not function in precisely the way the colonists
intended. As we have grown older, bigger, and more complex,
the system has developed flaws, distortions, and malfunctionings.
In such a situation the citizenry, acting through the government,
is normally called upon to make adjustments and lend support.
In the case of freedom of expression, however, such intervention
by government entails unusual risks. The paradox of looking to
government for regulation of a system that, by definition, is im-
mune from government control presents one of the most diffi-
cult problems of our age.
Yet we cannot assume that the problem is beyond solution.
As we move inevitably toward a more collective society, we can-
not retain the proper balance between individual rights and col-
lective responsibility without mastering this dilemma. In some
ways it must be considered the coming issue of our times.
Ultimately it is necessary to develop a set of basic principles
that will permeate our society and control our practices. Some
slight movement in that direction can be discerned. In creating
the Office of Economic Opportunity we established and gave
government support to some institutions that used the right to
freedom of expression, thus enhanced, to attack the government
and oppose its policies. The OEO is no longer with us, but the
Legal Services Corporation carries on the tradition to some ex-
tent. And the government does award research grants or funds
4 5 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. 1974). An example of a state freedom of
information law patterned after the federal model is N.Y. PUB. OFFICERS §§ 85 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1976).
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to universities and other institutions that, as understood in ad-
vance, may not adhere to official positions or desires. The Su-
preme Court has taken an important step in approving public
subsidies in presidential election campaigns.46 We must explore
other possibilities and gradually move forward in this area.
IV. FACILITATING SOCIAL CHANGE
The operation of the system of freedom of expression in
resolving social conflict and facilitating social change has had
mixed results. This function has, of course, been affected by the
same factors at work in connection with the function of permit-
ting political participation.
On the whole, our society has certainly been an open one in
which we have attempted to solve our problems through discus-
sion rather than force. In the main we have done so, although
force or threat of force has hastened some of the resolutions.
There have been times, however, when the channels for discus-
sion of radical or even unorthodox alternatives have been virtu-
ally closed off, as during the McCarthy period. And the failure
surely damaged our efforts to deal with the issues facing us in
the cold war and particularly during the Viet Nam war. More-
over, the distortions of the system by reason of the one-di-
mensional impact of the mass media have undoubtedly slowed
our recognition, and our solutions, of many of the problems
caused by business practices that failed to recognize the social
costs involved. Our delay in working out an answer to some of
our environmental problems and our groping for a solution to
the energy problem, particularly nuclear energy, are examples
of this impact.
In addition we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the use
of the system of freedom of expression to effectuate social
change was under the most severe pressure in our history during
the Watergate period. It is some measure of the strength of the
system among our leadership and among citizens as a whole that
we survived the Watergate challenge.
In general, the system is now functioning in greater accor-
dance with its basic purposes. We are not entitled to be overly
optimistic, but there is a real chance that we can use it to solve
our problems in a rational and peaceful way.
46 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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V. PERSONAL SELF-FULFILLMENT
The function of the system of freedom of expression in
allowing personal fulfillment has, in my judgment, been substan-
tially realized at a certain level. Every person has extensive rights
to speak, write, create works of art, or otherwise express himself
or herself in similar ways. Whether that person can find an audi-
ence is, of course, another matter. Every person also has full
rights to read, listen, observe, or otherwise receive communica-
tions. Again, there is no assurance that material of interest to
him or her will be available. The right to form or hold beliefs is
absolute, or nearly so. Thus, while there are many forces in our
society that exert a repressive influence on the individual per-
sonality, the mandate of the first amendment does provide a
foundation from which realization of human potential can begin.
The important and interesting question is whether the first
amendment can be utilized to a greater degree in encouraging
this development. To be sure, no one would suggest that the first
amendment by itself could produce a liberated society, either in
terms of Herbert Marcuse or Charles Reich, or in any other
meaningful terms. 47 But it might be interpreted to embrace a
wider area than it does now.
This broader range of the first amendment would protect
forms of expression that are not so clearly related to verbal ex-
pression and that tend to involve more the relation of the indi-
vidual to the collective rather than the individual in an isolated
capacity. In this respect development of a wider scope for the
first amendment would be akin to the development of the right
to privacy. It would be responsive to the same needs, namely to
encourage and protect areas of life that are threatened with
domination by the growth of collective power. It would, in short,
attempt to draw a more sensitive line between the rights and
obligations of the person as an individual and as a member of
the collective-between what the good society would regard as
the private and the public spheres of life.
For example, the first amendment might be interpreted to
forbid governmental interference with expression of the indi-
vidual personality as shown through one's life style-one's
clothing, hair style, appearance, mode of living, sexual prefer-
ences, career or lack of career. Or it might impose limitations on
47 
See generally H. MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION (1966); H. MARCUSE, ONE-
DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964); C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970).
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state paternalism, as in the requirement to use crash helmets,
or in restrictions on the right to choose one's style of death. Or
greater protection might be extended to rights of conscience-
individual positions held not only as a result of religious convic-
tions but out of intense moral or ethical feeling.
To put the first amendment to such uses would undoubt-
edly carry us far beyond what the colonists specifically had in
mind. And, of all the justices who have sat upon the Supreme
Court only Mr. Justice Douglas and, to a somewhat lesser degree,
Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall would appear to have had any
place in their philosophy for such an extension of the first
amendment.48 Moreover, there are enormous difficulties in
working out the appropriate doctrines. It would be hard to sep-
arate expression from action in this context. Nor would it be easy
to decide just when the rights of the individual ended and those
of the collective began. The formulation of reasonably precise,
workable rules would be hazardous. Yet these issues seem to me
worth serious attention. It may be that the system of freedom of
expression should begin to grow in this direction.
VI. ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE
One more set of problems remains to be noted. The extent
to which the substantive rights set forth in the first amendment
serve the interests the colonists had in mind depends upon rules
and practices relating to their administration and enforcement.
These are matters that affect not only the first amendment but
the entire Bill of Rights and, indeed, all protections for the indi-
vidual to be found in our constitutional scheme. They cannot be
discussed here, but I must point out that the trend of decisions
in the Supreme Court in this area has given rise to very serious
concern. Recent rulings on standing, class actions, attorney's
fees, federal jurisdiction, remedies, and similar matters have had
the result of making the federal courts less available and less
effective for the vindication of first amendment rights. The
problems of the federal courts that are given as justification for
this development should not be ignored. But the solution of
48 See Symposium, In Honor of Mr. Justice Douglas, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 341, 356-57
(1974). See also Freeman v. Almon Flake, 405 U.S. 1032 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari). For the views of Mr. Justice Marshall, see Kelley v. Johnson,
425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (dissenting opinion); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 427
(1974) (concurring opinion); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1974)
(dissenting opinion).
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these problems need not and must not forego adequate en-
forcement of longstanding rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution.
VII. CONCLUSION
In establishing the political and legal basis for a system of
freedom of expression the colonists were both daring and op-
timistic. They were willing to try an experiment that, in its full
ramifications, was unprecedented. They were eager to make the
attempt because they believed in progress; because they believed
that mankind could learn from its mistakes, innovate, and
gradually move forward; and because they believed that, ulti-
mately, rationality, liberation, and peace would prevail. On the
whole I believe that history has so far justified their expectations
and their hopes. The system of freedom of expression, both in
its theory and in its practices, has slowly matured. Today, despite
all its defects, it represents a remarkable achievement. Whether
it will continue to grow and adapt to new circumstances, or lose
its vitality and be abandoned, depends upon whether we, like the
colonists, are daring and have faith in our capacity for progress.
